3 Questions: Scott Kemp on North Korea’s nuclear program
For years now, the chief strategy for curtailing North Korea’s ability to build more nuclear weapons has entailed attempts to block access to critical technologies needed by its nuclear program. But R. Scott Kemp, an assistant professor of nuclear science and engineering at MIT and director of its recently formed Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, has found evidence — by combing through publicly available sources— that the secretive state may have managed an end-run around those restrictions, enabling it to build centrifuges and other equipment needed to produce weapons-grade uranium. The findings were presented this week at a conference in South Korea by Kemp’s collaborator on the project, Joshua Pollock, a Washington-based security consultant. MIT News asked Kemp about how the new study was conducted and the significance of its findings.Q. Can you describe the methodology you used to find out about these possible developments in North Korea’s nuclear...